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SOIFER'S VISION AND THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT
IMAGES
MnmNEP S. BALL*
Always the insightful teacher, Aviam Soifer instructively provides us
with a thoughtful, sobering account of how the Supreme Court disdains
the plainest human contexts of parties before it-their affective, locating
placement in groups and histories-and devises instead its own capricious
programs for sorting people into abstract categories. The Court claims to
act with judicially appropriate, rational, egalitarian neutrality. Professor
Soifer suggests that, in effect, a jurisprudential air inversion has formed
over the Court enveloping it in a blinding, dehumanizing, toxic haze.
He proposes that the court is groping its way back to Truax v. Corrigan'
and the aggressive deployment of equal protection jurisprudence against
powerless minorities by blinking history and human connections and by
positing that, for purposes of constitutional adjudication, we are all dis-
embodied, individual ciphers and therefore all the same. Now that Professor
Soifer has taught me to identify this newest and oldest equal protection
that is no protection, I have begun to discover it outgrowing Fourteenth
Amendment cases and becoming a kind of all-purpose mode for other civil
rights adjudication as well.
The Court can find that any right denied equally is not denied. Already,
for example, even Justice O'Connor has observed how the Court can relegate
"a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny
that the Equal Protection Clause already provides.
'" 2
Free speech and free exercise of religion denied equally are not denied,
according to the Court. But as Soifer points out, the equality in this
equation is not equality except by a science fiction construct that "sacrifices
the diverse history of groups for abstractions about deracinated individuals
who float equally above reality. ' 3 Rights denied equally, it turns out, are
rights denied to minorities.
Professor Soifer invites us to very different visions than those of the
current Court, very different visions of judicial responsibility, of the role
of communities and history in egalitarian forms of justice, and of the
structure of a mature, just society. He thinks that judges must undertake
the difficult labor of grasping groups and facts in their history. He thinks
this because he believes that complex past influences-including those em-
anating from government in general and the Court in particular-have borne
harm to particular groups and their present circumstances.
* Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
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I have been educated on these matters by Professor Soifer and, in
search of further good instruction from him, make comments, that really
are questions, on three aspects of his paper.
I. TnB CouRT's ImAGE OF AMERICA: WHERE DOES IT THINK ITSELF TO BE?
Soifer says the Court shares "a pervasive national nostalgia for a
simpler, freer, and happier time-that-never-was." '4 Why does the Court
entertain this dream of a somewhere over the rainbow? Does it believe itself
now materialized in the midst of a Hobbesian nightmare in which the
justices have been set down in the newly emergent democracy of a third-
world nation where they must defend fragile institutions of stability and
government against anarchic assault?
Consider these reports of falling sky: In McCleskey v. Kemp the Court
saw the claim that Georgia's capital sentencing scheme was racially discrim-
inatory as "throw[ing] into serious question the principles that underlie our
entire criminal justice system." 5 The Court was alarmed that it "could soon
be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty. ' 6 In Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., as Soifer notes, the Court feared that vindication of
Richmond's set-aside program "would be to open the door to competing
claims for 'remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group."' 7 In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,'the Court abandoned
the compelling interest test in free exercise of religion cases because contin-
ued use would permit a believer, "by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a
law unto himself'. . ... " and that "would be courting anarchy ... ,
What threats to the entire system? What door open to a flood of claims
from disadvantaged groups? What anarchy? Why does the Court say these
things? Are our majoritarian institutions besieged by woozles and heffal-
umps?
We do not teeter on the brink of a war of all against all except in the
wildest of fearful imaginings. We are neither a newly emergent democracy
nor a lesser developed nation. Our governmental institutions are not on the
point of collapse, and our prosperity is unparalleled.
The problem is not the one the Court perceives but its opposite. The
threat is not the anarchy of each for herself but the very different anarchy,
identified by James Madison, that inheres in "a society under the forms of
which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker." 9
As Hannah Arendt notes, the word "people" retained for the nation's
founders "the meaning of manyness, of the endless variety of a multitude
whose majesty resided in its plurality."' 0 The founders opposed "public
4. Soifer, supra note 3 at 392.
5. 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987).
6. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987).
7. 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989).
8. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (citation omitted).
9. THE FEDE ALIST No. 51, at 352 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
10. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLuTIoN 88 (1963).
COMMENT
opinion, namely ... the potential unanimity of all" for "they knew that
the public realm in a republic was constituted by an exchange of opinion
between equals, and that this realm would simply disappear the very moment
an exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the
same opinion.... [I]n their eyes, the rule of public opinion was a form
of tyranny."'
1
Our remarkable prosperity and freedom are withheld from a substantial
portion of the population, largely people of color. The prosperous, free
majority, politically uninterested in the massive problems of poor people,
rules chiefly through public opinion and the public opinion poll that is very
like the French Revolution's plebiscite.
Majoritarianism is not at risk. The problem is not threats to uniformity
but the threat posed by uniformity, the unity of the stronger faction, the
unanimity of the great, mostly white majority who enjoy freedom and
prosperity. Instead of alleviating this threat, the real and not the imagined
one, the Court has exacerbated it and "affirmatively allied itself with the
politics of white resentment.' ' 2 In the name of equality, it entrenches the
white majority more deeply and enhances the conditions for the tyranny of
public opinion.
Professor Soifer cites the Court's repudiation, in Croson, of "a mosaic
of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past
wrongs"' 3 and rightly cites it as a rejection of "mosaic law." He is not the
first to make the connection between a cultural mosaic and mosaic law.
When he was inaugurated as Mayor of New York City, David Dinkins
rejoiced to "see New York as a gorgeous mosaic of race and religious faith,
of national origin and sexual orientation, of individuals whose families
arrived yesterday and generations ago, coming through Ellis Island or
Kennedy Airport or on buses bound for the Port Authority.' '1 4 Harry
Belafonte, who presided over the Mayor's inaugural ceremony then gave
the word "mosaic" what the New York Times editorially termed "a deft
political twist in a City where a quarter of the voters are Jewish. Mosaic,
he noted, can also mean related to Moses-as in Mosaic law and the respect
for law on which just societies rely.' 5 The editorial went on to note:
The word mosaic, meaning a picture made of inlaid bits of glass
or stone, comes from a late Middle English word, 'musycke,' which,
like music, relates to things artistic. It derives from the Muses, the
nine goddesses of arts and sciences. The Dinkins era now elevates
a tenth, the gorgeous Muse of mosaic politics.' 6
11. Id. at 88-89.
12. Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REy. 2152,
2161 (1989).
13. Soifer, supra note 3 at 397.
14. Text of Dinkins Speech: 'We are All Foot Soldiers on the March to Freedom,' N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at B2, col. 1.
15. The Mosaic Thing, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
16. Id.
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The mosaic metaphor had been employed earlier by Mario Cuomo in
his mayoral campaign of 1977 as a description of the city and three years
before that as an image of the United States. "I never liked the idea of
'melting pot,"' Cuomo said. "Our strength is not in melting together, but
in keeping our cultures." Mayor Dinkins "says he never liked the idea of
denying cultural differences either."
'' 7
The 1990 census reports a striking shift toward an America of minori-
ties.' 8 Demographic realities may allow us to become more mosaic and
awaken us from the nightmarish tyranny of the rule of public opinion. Or
do I have it wrong? Is it the demographic realities that are the nightmare
from which the Court seeks relief in dreaming of times that never were? Is
that why it sacrifices the diverse human, humanizing contexts of groups for
surrealistic abstractions about free-floating individuals?
II. THm CouRT's IMAGE OF ITS ROLE: WHAT IS IT RESPONSIBLE TO DO?
Soifer says the Court must do the hard, particularizing work. of consid-
ering the "[c]omplex, dark, even harrowing histories of discrete groups.... ."19
The support for his appeal is a belief in judicial review solicitous of powerless
minorities. I do not think that Soifer is animated alone by a stubborn
refusal to believe in the death of paragraph three of footnote four of
Carolene Products. (I have been applying cardio-pulmonary resuscitation
techniques to it for almost two decades now, notwithstanding the fatal
blows dealt it by its friends like John Ely and its enemies like Chief Justice
Rehnquist.) 2°
Footnote four was born and buried in my lifetime. Its life coincided,
for the most part, with the Warren Court. But it did have earlier antici-
pations. Marbury v. Madison was a precursor. In that case John Marshall
identified our government as one "of laws, and not of men." '2' Oddly,
Marshall's statement came to stand for the proposition that to be governed
by law is to be governed by neutral principles, abstractions and rules. That
is, it is taken as a founding statement of the view that Professor Soifer
critiques. This is not what Marshall meant. After stating that this is a
government of laws and not of men, he added in the next sentences, by
way of explanation, that our government would "certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right." 22 Government of law, that is to say, is responsive
17. Id.
18. Barringer, Census Shows Profound Change In Racial Makeup of the Nation, N.Y.
Times, March 11, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
19. Soifer, supra note 3 at 418.
20. See Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IowA L. Rsv. 1059 (1974);
Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote: A Response and Alternative to Tushnet, Bobbitt, and the
Revised Texas Version of Constitutional Law, 59 TEx. L. REv. 787 (1981) [hereinafter Don't
Die Don Quixote]; M. BALL, TIHE PROMISE OF Am cRIcA LAW 95-125 (1981).
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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government, one where law provides redress for felt grievances. Government
of law requires courts that are responsive as Soifer and Carolene Products
would have them to be.
Much older than Marbury v. Madison are the biblical images of judg-
ment, and it is these, I believe, that are the true source of the Soifer vision.
Psalm 82, in its intercession on behalf of the king begins:
Give the king thy justice, 0 God,
and thy righteousness to the royal son!
May he judge thy people with righteousness,
and thy poor with justice!
May he defend the cause of the poor of the people,
give deliverance to the needy
and crush the oppressor!
To the same effect is Psalm 82:
Give justice to the weak and fatherless;
maintain the right of the afflicted and the destitute.
Rescue the weak and the needy;
deliver them from the hand of the wicked.
There is neither neutrality nor abstraction in this constituting image
that informs, I suspect, Soifer's expectation of the Court. This is to say
that I do not think Soifer is a liberal who suffers nostalgia for the Warren
Court and the good old days, although there would be nothing wrong with
that. Something else is going on here.
Judge Skelly Wright observed that a generation of us has "seen that
affairs can be ordered in conformance to constitutional ideals and that
injustice.., can be routed. They have seen that it can be done: the Warren
Court did it and the heavens did not fall."2' Too much can be claimed for
the Warren Court, which, after all, intervened only when very fundamental
interests of discrete and insular minorities vere at stake.? It did, however,
provide a brief, shining moment, not in the sentimental sense of Camelot
but in the sense that once Thomas Edison illuminated the first bulb, the
reality of electric light was established.
Soifer is not merely utopian or merely liberal. He understands that the
legitimacy of the body politic together with its courts depends upon the
least members being protected:
The body is solicitous for its parts and simply follows self-interest
in preserving them. The body's actions require maturity, coordi-
nation, or movement in concert, for which no member is less
23. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HAv.
L. REv. 769, 805 (1971).
24. See Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HAmv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
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significant than another. Indeed, "[tihe greater honor [is given] to
the inferior part, that there may be no discord in the body, but
that the members may have the same care for one another." This
equality of care in its political form-justice-transposes rather than
eliminates rank: the last shall be first and the first last. 
2
Is it not the role of the Court to protect the powerless? Were Carolene
Products and the Warren Court and Justice Brennan not correct? And is
it not also the responsibility of the Court in protecting the powerless to
make us believe that this is the right thing to do:
The model for such experiments is the medieval theologian Anselm
who sought to prove "by reason alone" the truth he held by faith.
As [Karl] Barth points out, the vital presupposition that underlies
Anselm's demonstrations of rationality is singular. Anselm the
believer assumes that what he shares with the disbeliever, whose
very disbelief he is addressing, is theology and Christian dogmatics.
Barth observes that "divine simplicity and the way of the most
incredible deception have always run parallel, separated only by the
merest hair's breadth." Judges are not theologians. I here offer
Anselm as a model only for method. He addressed disbelievers as
if they believed. He employed reason as if what it proved was
believed to be true. Courts use reason in their opinions to prove
the common sense of protection for minorities as if we believed its
compelling validity. The underlying belief then is appealed to and
nourished in the process by the whole performance as it mirrors
our nature.
26
If a thread can be discerned connecting biblical imagery, Carolene
Products, the Warren Court, and solicitude for discrete and insular minor-
ities, how is this thread to be woven into the work of the current Court?
How can it make believers of us if it has no faith? How is it first to be
led to belief? That is, how can it be led to grasp groups and facts in their
history and ours if it lacks the will and commitment to do so?
III. OUR IMAGE OF TIE FUTURE: WHAT ARE WE TO DO?
Professor Soifer prescribed three remedies for the Court. He is correct
to note that, mild and conservative though these remedies are, they are
unlikely to be followed any time soon. So what are we to do in the
meantime? Is not the meantime likely to be lengthy-lengthier and more
trying than Soifer, ever the careful, scholarly historian, lets on? And will
not more, more powerful responses be needed?
For starters, do we not need to take a careful look at the way we teach
law? To what community connections are our students exposed by us and
25. Ball, Don't Die Don Quixote, supra note 20, at 802-03 (quoting I Cor. 12:24-25).
26. Id. at 808-09.
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our teaching? Should we not be more forthcoming in exhibiting our own
humanity, our own shaping location in groups? Should we not encourage
students to honor their and their own and their colleagues' group connec-
tions? Should we not in the form and substance of our teaching, in the
structure and conduct of our law schools give demonstration of law practiced
within and for communities?
Should we not begin to provide alternate notions of who and what a
judge is, that judgment does not require deracination? Why do we insist
upon and honor the tendency of Supreme Court justices to remove them-
selves from ordinary social intercourse? In John Marshall's day, the justices
shared rooms in a boarding house accessible to the public. Should we not
find acceptable contemporary means for the Court to interact with hu-
manity? Would we not do well to adopt Thomas Grey's suggestion and
advertise the justices as members of a kind of bureaucracy dispute resolution
committee?27
And should we not teach students ways to avoid that committee by
developing the possibilities of state constitutions, of creative factfinding by
lower courts, and of expansive congressional legislation under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment? That is, should not constitutional law teachers
like me stop deifying the Supreme Court by our concentration upon it and
instead turn attention to the Constitution as having life outside the Supreme
Court building?
CONCLUSION
In a brief, graceful note of 1953, Mark DeWolfe Howe hailed the
significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral.u The case is largely unknown now but was regarded by Howe
as significant for political theory. He found it a breakthrough, a real world
step toward pluralism, inasmuch as it "recognized the liberty of the group
as something different from the individual liberties of its members .... "29
Howe tempered his momentary, subdued euphoria by advising that his
"bubble of theory"-his delight at the advance toward pluralism-may have
burst already at the time he wrote.a0
Professor Soifer is not blowing bubbles in the air. He is not engaged
in the idle play of abstract theory. He is addressing the sustenance of
minority groups. He would have us attend their histories and their futures.
He would have us do so for the sake of their redemption and therefore
also our own.
27. See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1984).
28. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
29. Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HRv. LAW REV.
91, 93 (1953) (New York could not transfer property of Russian Orthodox Church from
control of archbishop appointed by ecclesiastical hierarchy in Moscow to archbishop chosen
by Church's American hierarchy which had renounced Russian control).
30. Id. at 95.
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